Franco-British relations and the question of conscription in Britain, 1938-1939 by Hucker, Daniel
 1 
 
FRANCO-BRITISH RELATIONS AND THE QUESTION OF 
CONSCRIPTION IN BRITAIN, 1938-1939 
 
ABSTRACT - This article examines the relationship interaction between the French campaign for the 
introduction of British conscription during 1938-39 and the ebbs and flows of British public opinion on 
the same issue. In particular, it will demonstrate how French pressure for conscription varied in intensity 
depending on their perceptions of British opinion on the subject. It was this interaction between 
diplomatic and domestic pressures that ultimately compelled the British government to introduce 
conscription in April 1939. Furthermore, the issue of conscription also sheds light on the wider issue of 
Franco-British relations, revealing how French foreign policy was neither dictated by an ‘English 
Governess’ nor pursued independently of Great Britain. 
 
 
When Neville Chamberlain announced the introduction of conscription to the House of 
Commons on 26 April 1939 he not only reneged on previous promises but deviated 
from the traditional British aversion to peacetime compulsory service. Chamberlain 
defended himself by arguing that current international tensions could not be described as 
‘peace-time in any sense in which the term could fairly be used’.1 Nonetheless, 
introducing conscription – albeit in a limited form2 – was alien to British tradition. How, 
therefore, can the decision be explained? What motivated the government to take such a 
step? This article sheds new light on the British decision to implement conscription in 
April 1939, moving beyond existing analyses by showing that the decision was motivated 
not only by a fusion of domestic and international pressures but by the interaction of the 
two. More specifically, contends that French pressure for British conscription ebbed and 
flowed in direct correlation to the French government’s perceptions of the British 
public’s attitude towards compulsory military service. In particular, the growing public 
demand for conscription both in the immediate aftermath of the September 1938 
Munich Agreement and again after the German occupation of the rump Czech state in 
March 1939 encouraged the French to intensify their official interventions.  
In addition, the conscription question can be used as a ‘core sample’ with which 
to analyse the wider issue of Franco-British relations during the final months of peace.3 
                                                 
1 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, 346 House of Commons Debates, col. 1152. 
2 The form of conscription introduced applied only to men aged 20 and 21. 
3 This use of a ‘core sample’ borrows from Keith Neilson, who uses Anglo-Soviet relations as a ‘core 
sample’ for analysing the wider issue of British strategic foreign policy in the inter-war years. Britain, the 




French pressure for conscription certainly shows that the notion of an ‘English 
Governess’ does not stand up to scrutiny.4 However, the counter argument is also 
problematic. Talbot Imlay’s suggestion that France adopted a politique de fermeté 
independently of Britain is persuasive but not clear-cut.5 The conscription ‘core sample’ 
reveals that the reality was more ambiguous: although the French government 
undoubtedly became more assertive, it did not act entirely independently of Britain, 
always paying careful attention to British public opinion. Reports from the London 
embassy during 1938-9 indicated that British public opinion was sympathetic to the 
firmer foreign policy adopted by Paris and, moreover, was prepared to increase the 
degree of British commitment to France, even at the cost of conscription.  
    
I 
 
Chamberlain’s decision to introduce conscription in April 1939 has been attributed to 
French demands, domestic pressures, or a combination of the two. Talbot Imlay and 
Anthony Adamthwaite both suggest that French pressure was critical, whilst N. J. 
Crowson and Michael Dockrill emphasise the increased demands from within the 
Conservative Party 6. For Peter Dennis, Chamberlain’s decision was simultaneously ‘a 
political gesture to the French’ and a response to growing press and parliamentary 
pressure at home. Brian Bond concurs, suggesting that Chamberlain was ‘obliged to bow 
to these combined diplomatic and domestic pressures’.7 However, neither Dennis nor 
Bond attempt to tease out the links between French pressure and the British press and 
political campaign for conscription during 1938-9. This article seeks to do just that, 
illustrating how France’s demand for a British ‘effort du sang’ was contingent upon their 
                                                 
4 For more on the notion of an ‘English Governess’ controlling the direction of French foreign policy, see 
François Bédarida, ‘La “gouvernante anglaise”’, in René Rémond and Janine Bourdin (eds.), Édouard 
Daladier, chef de gouvernement : avril 1938-septembre 1939, (Paris: Presses de la FNSP, 1977), 228-240, and John 
Herman, The Paris Embassy of Sir Eric Phipps: Anglo-French Relations and the Foreign Office, 1937-1939, 
(Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1998), 90-93. 
5 Talbot Imlay, ‘The Making of the Anglo-French Alliance, 1938-39’, in Martin S. Alexander and William J. 
Philpott, eds., Anglo-French Defence Relations Between the Wars, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 92-
120. 
6 Imlay, Facing the Second World War, 92; Anthony Adamthwaite, France and the Coming of the Second World War, 
1936-1939, (London: Frank Cass, 1977), 245-263; N. J. Crowson, Facing Fascism: The Conservative Party and the 
European Dictators, 1935-1940, (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 147-167; idem., ‘The Conservative Party and 
the Call for National Service, 1937-39: Compulsion versus Voluntarism’, Contemporary Record, 9:3 (1995), 
507-528; Michael Dockrill, British Establishment Perspectives on France, 1936-40, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1999), 133. 
7 Peter Dennis, Decision by Default: Peacetime Conscription and British Defence, 1919-1939 (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1972), 2; Brian Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1980), 308-9. 
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perceptions of British public opinion. That is, official French interventions regarding 
conscription were timed carefully to exploit a seemingly favourable climate of British 
public opinion. 
During 1938-9, British public opinion became increasingly favourable towards 
peacetime conscription, especially after the Munich Agreement and after Hitler marched 
into Prague in March 1939. Simultaneously, the French government became more 
assertive, stepping up their efforts to secure a greater British military commitment to the 
continent. Crucially there is compelling circumstantial evidence to suggest that these 
efforts were inspired, at least in part, by perceptions of British public and press opinion. 
After Munich, reports from the French ambassador in London, Charles Corbin, 
indicated growing public support for conscription. Corbin’s frequent reports, which 
formed the basis of the Quai d’Orsay’s understanding of British opinion, were based 
largely on a reading of a cross-section of the mainstream British press. During the 
autumn of 1938, Corbin rightly noted that the conservative newspapers, notably those 
owned by Lord Beaverbrook, urged the introduction of conscription. Interestingly, this 
press campaign undermines the argument that the National Government manipulated 
the press, as several conservative journals had few qualms about canvassing support for a 
policy that Chamberlain clearly opposed.8 Unsurprisingly, Paris detected a fissure 
between the British government and public, thus encouraging the French government to 
intensify their official pressure for London to introduce conscription. 
The French campaign for British conscription has already been well-documented, 
and British sources certainly support Imlay’s contention that conscription was ‘aimed in 
large part at reassuring the French’.9 The foreign office feared that failing to introduce 
compulsory service might prove disastrous for French morale, even causing the French 
side of the entente to collapse altogether. On 1 November 1938, the foreign secretary, 
Lord Halifax, warned the British ambassador in Paris, Sir Eric Phipps, that France might 
even ‘turn so defeatist as to give up the struggle of maintaining adequate defences even 
for the safety of Metropolitan France’.10 In light of such fears, conscription was seen as a 
means for assuaging French concerns, providing tangible proof of a British continental 
commitment. However, impetus for conscription was not confined to official diplomatic 
                                                 
8 The argument that Chamberlain’s government manipulated the press has been made by Richard Cockett, 
Twilight of Truth: Chamberlain, Appeasement & the Manipulation of the Press, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1989), and Anthony Adamthwaite, ‘The British Government and the Media, 1937-1938’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, 18:2 (1983), 281-297. 
9 Imlay, Facing the Second World War, 92. 
10 Halifax to Phipps, 1 Nov. 1938, The National Archives (TNA), FO 800/311. 
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pressure from France, as the press campaign in Britain clearly revealed. Indeed, as 
Michael Howard has argued, Britain’s increasingly continental outlook ‘did not outrun 
public opinion’.11 
That British opinion was apparently one step ahead of their government with 
regard to conscription was certainly noted by the French embassy in London. Of course, 
one must acknowledge that embassy staff had ulterior motives for portraying a growing 
desire in Britain to resist the dictators by force, particularly after Munich. As Yvon 
Lacaze has argued, Corbin ‘sought to discern an evolution in British opinion towards 
firmness’, thus helping to strengthen the hand of those in Paris who favoured a policy of 
resistance over foreign minister Georges Bonnet’s policy of retreat.12 Indeed, Corbin was 
hostile to appeasement and, as John Herman has noted, this conviction was strengthened 
by his friendship ‘with Churchill, Eden, Amery, Duff Cooper and especially Vansittart’.13 
In addition, any indication of a growing firmness in Britain helped alleviate concerns 
regarding domestic opinion in France. Throughout the summer of 1938, French opinion 
had become increasingly anxious about the degree of support that would be forthcoming 
from Britain in the event of a Franco-German conflict. As Lacaze has remarked, French 
newspapers during the critical weeks of September 1938 ‘insisted more than ever on the 
Franco-British entente’.14 
To be sure, the French embassy represented British public opinion in such a way 
as to undermine appeasement and assuage the anxieties of public opinion in France. 
Nevertheless, this must not blind us to the fact that British opinion after Munich was 
evolving dramatically in favour of compulsory national service. As recently as the start of 
1938, longstanding British hostility to continental entanglements continued to suggest 
that a large-scale continental force was both unnecessary and impractical. Furthermore, 
memories of the last war rendered the public suspicious of sending troops to the 
continent, evoking Paschendaele and the Somme, and the slaughter of hundreds of 
                                                 
11 Michael Howard has argued that Britain’s increasingly continental outlook ‘did not outrun public 
opinion’, The Continental Commitment: The Dilemmas of British Defence Policy in the Era of Two World Wars, 
(London: Maurice Temple Smith Ltd., 1972), 121-46. 
12
 Yvon Lacaze, ‘Daladier, Bonnet and the Decision-Making Process during the Munich Crisis, 1938’, in 
Robert Boyce (ed.), French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918-1940: The decline and fall of a great power, (London: 
Routledge, 1998), 227. For more on the orientation of French foreign policy after Munich, see Imlay, ‘The 
Making of the Anglo-French Alliance’, 92-120, and Robert Young, ‘The Aftermath of Munich: The Course 
of French Diplomacy, October 1938 – March 1939’, French Historical Studies, Vol. 8 no. 2 (1973), 305-322. 
13
 John Herman, The Paris Embassy of Sir Eric Phipps: Anglo-French Relations and the Foreign Office, 1937-1939, 
(Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1998), 27. The anti-appeasement stance of the French Embassy in 
London also comes across in Girard de Charbonnière’s Les plus évitable de toutes les guerres, (Paris: Albatros, 
1985). 
14
 Lacaze, L’opinion publique française et la crise de Munich,  259. 
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thousands of young men; ‘No more Sommes’ was the watchword in the interwar 
period.15 British strategy did not, however, overlook continental Europe.16 Indeed, the 
advent of Nazism demanded that Britain take her continental commitment seriously. As 
the then prime minister, Stanley Baldwin, told the Commons in July 1934: ‘When you 
think of the defence of England you no longer think of the chalk cliffs of Dover; you 
think of the Rhine’.17 Moreover, advancements in aerial warfare directly threatened 
Britain’s security, undermining the security provided by island status. The integrity of 
France and the Low Countries was therefore crucial for Britain; should these countries 
fall into hostile hands, aerial raids on Britain would be increasingly damaging and 
frequent.18   
Nevertheless, the concept of ‘limited liability’ prevailed in the mid-1930s.19 The 
National Government embraced this viewpoint, while the Labour opposition had always 
been hostile to large-scale continental commitments.20 Moreover, a latent distrust of 
France continued to inform perceptions. For many in Britain, France’s quest for sécurité 
was an almost paranoid obsession, and French intransigence was often considered to 
have legitimized German revanchism.21 There was also a growing awareness that modern 
warfare had progressed since 1914-18, and that military doctrine must adapt accordingly. 
The size of the army was no longer paramount, as technological advancements meant 
that future conflicts would be decided not by sheer volume of troops but by their 
mobility and standard of equipment. Therefore, a small professional army, equipped to 
the most advanced standards of the day, was potentially more potent than a large, ill-
equipped and inadequately trained conscript force.22  
                                                 
15 William Philpott, ‘The General Staff and the Paradoxes of Continental War’, in David French and Brian 
Holden Reid, eds., The British General Staff: Reform and Innovation, c.1890-1939, (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 
95-111. 
16 J. P. Harris, ‘The British General Staff and the Coming of War, 1933-39’, in French and Holden Reid, 
eds., The British General Staff, 175-191, at 190. 
17 Cited in Bond, British Military Policy, 209. 
18 Harris, ‘The British General Staff and the Coming of War, 1933-39’, 175-91.   
19 Howard, The Continental Commitment, 96-120; Bond, British Military Policy, 209-29. 
20 Jerry H. Brookshire, ‘“Speak for England”, Act for England: Labour’s Leadership and British National 
Security Under the Threat of War in the Late 1930s’, European History Quarterly, Vol. 29, no. 2 (1999), 251-
87. 
21 In late 1935, Sir Henry Pownall, argued that German revanchism could have been avoided had she ‘been 
properly treated and allowed some revision of at least the disarmament clauses of the Treaty. But the chief 
blame for the failure to do that must surely lie with the French’. Cited in Brian Bond, ed., Chief of Staff: The 
Diaries of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall, vol. 1, 1933-1940, (London: L. Cooper, 1972), 55. More 
generally, French preponderance in continental Europe power upset the British strategy of maintaining a 
balance of power. See B. J. C. McKercher, ‘The Foreign Office, 1930-39: Strategy, Permanent Interests and 
National Security’, Contemporary British History, Vol. 18, no. 3 (2004), 87-109, at 95. 
22 David French, Raising Churchill’s Army: The British Army and the War Against Germany, 1919-1945, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 15. 
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These factors underpinned the concept of limited liability, and Chamberlain was 
a committed advocate. In March 1937, he was convinced that ‘we shall never again send 
to the continent an army on the scale of that which we put into the field in the Great 
War’. Chamberlain’s appointee as war minister, Leslie Hore-Belisha, concurred: ‘our 
army should be organised to defend this country and the empire . . ., to organise it with a 
military prepossession in favour of a continental commitment is wrong’.23 In a defence 
paper in February 1938, Hore-Belisha recommended that ‘our allies should be left in no 
doubt as to the possibilities of direct assistance on our part’.24 Under Chamberlain’s 
premiership, the concept of ‘limited liability’ appeared to have reached its zenith. Indeed, 
Michael Howard has suggested that the concept had essentially become a policy ‘of no 
liability at all’.25 Such was the British position by the time Édouard Daladier formed a 
new French government in April 1938. For Daladier, with his wealth of experience at the 





In February 1938, the chief of the French general staff, Maurice Gamelin summarized 
the British military commitment to France. In the event of a European war, he noted, 
British assistance would be ‘insignificant, more or less from the start’.26 Consequently, 
Daladier’s forthcoming visit to London in April 1938 was seen in Paris as an opportunity 
to ask Britain to take, ‘measures permitting them to despatch an expeditionary force in 
proportion to their population’, even at ‘the cost of conscription’.27 The British 
government, however, were obdurate. As Duff Cooper remarked in his diary, the cabinet 
had decided to ‘tell the French that the prospect of our sending a force to the continent 
in the event of war is too remote to be worth discussing’.28 Consequently, Halifax re-
                                                 
23 Chamberlain to Liddell-Hart, 8 Mar. 1937, cited in Alex Danchev, Alchemist of War: The Life of Basil 
Liddell-Hart, (London: Phoenix Giant, 1999), 191; Hore-Belisha to Chamberlain, 23 Nov. 1937, cited in 
Bond, British Military Policy, 253. 
24 ‘The Organisation of the Army for its rôle in war’, Cabinet paper by Hore-Belisha, 10 Feb. 1938, TNA, 
WO 33/1502. 
25 Howard, The Continental Commitment, 117. 
26 Gamelin to Daladier, ‘Les données actuelles du problème militaire française’, 11 Feb. 1938, Archives 
Nationales (AN), Fonds Daladier, 496 AP/30, 4 DA 3 dr. 1 sdra. 
27 Note sur la collaboration militaire franco-britannique, 24 Apr. 1938, AN, Fonds Daladier, 496 AP/35, 4 
DA 8 Dr. 3 sdrb. 
28 John Julius Norwich (ed.), The Duff Cooper Diaries, 1915-1951, (London: Phoenix, 2006), diary entry for 22 
Apr. 1938, 246. 
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iterated to the French that Britain could only contribute two divisions.29 The French 
voiced little dissent. Not only had British obstinacy had left little room for manoeuvre, 
but British public opinion endorsed their government’s position. As Corbin noted, the 
British press remained ‘alarmed’ by the prospect of peacetime conscription.30   
 However, the rapid evolution of international events in 1938 forced the British 
public to re-evaluate continental commitments. The Czechoslovakian crisis exposed 
British military shortcomings, which were readily acknowledged to have contributed to 
the Munich capitulation. The Daily Mail warned that work must be done so that ‘no gaps 
remain to be filled at the last moment’.31 Cabinet members perceived a change in the 
public mood. The home secretary, Sir John Simon, detected a increased willingness to 
serve, the public now realising ‘the extent of the sacrifice that must be made for 
Britain’.32 The specific issue of conscription was also raised, particularly in the 
Beaverbrook newspapers. The Daily Express argued that Chamberlain must ‘change his 
views on conscription’, whilst Duff Cooper, who resigned from the cabinet in protest at 
Munich, wrote in the Evening Standard that ‘conscription is the cry that leaps to all men’s 
mouths’.33 For Beaverbrook, there was no contradiction between advocating isolationism 
and conscription. ‘The Isolationists have always supported preparations for defence’, he 
wrote to one of his many correspondents, ‘and the Isolationists are in favour of 
compulsory military service for the youth of the country’.34  
Elsewhere in the press, a Daily Mail ballot revealed that a majority favoured 
conscription in the immediate aftermath of Munich, although opinion became more 
divided as tensions eased in subsequent days. 35 Nevertheless, a poll conducted by the 
British Institute of Public Opinion (BIPO), published in The News Chronicle on 19 
October, showed 78% in favour of a national register, including the majority of 
opposition supporters. As Corbin reported, the press campaign was echoed in 
Parliament, with a growing clamour for, ‘if not conscription pure and simple, at least a 
form of “national service”’. Furthermore, remarked Corbin, the BIPO poll indicated that 
                                                 
29 Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP), 3rd ser., I, no. 164. 
30 Corbin to Bonnet, 5 Jun. 1938, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (MAE), Série Z, Grande-Bretagne, no. 
237. 
31 Daily Mail, editorial, 3 Oct. 1938. 
32 339 H. C. Deb. 5s, col. 308. 
33 Daily Express, editorial, 7 Oct. 1938; Duff Cooper, Evening Standard, 19 Oct. 1938.   
34 Beaverbrook to James Agate, 5 Oct. 1938, Beaverbrook Papers, House of Lords Record Office, 
BBK/B/292. 
35 The Daily Mail launched the ballot on 12 Oct. 1938, and published the results on 28 Oct. 1938. The Daily 
Mail avoided stating an editorial preference, merely seeking to ‘gain those opinions [of their readers], and 
present the weight of them to the authorities’, (12 Oct. 1938).  
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the majority of the public were ‘favourable to the rapid organisation of a national 
register’.36 French hopes were raised that the British government would now enhance 
their level of commitment to France, and Paris thus seized the opportunity to intensify 
their official interventions advocating the introduction of conscription.   
One particularly effective way of stressing the need for enhanced British 
commitment was perpetuating British fears of French defeatism, convincing London that 
the lack of British support unsettled French public opinion. Of course, this was not 
entirely fabrication, as Phipps was quite accurate in reporting that the French press had, 
throughout the Czechoslovakian crisis, unanimously ‘declared that Anglo-French co-
operation was essential’.37 Furthermore, there were compelling political and military 
imperatives for ensuring effective co-operation between the two democracies. At the 
Radical party congress in late October, Georges Bonnet declared the cornerstone of his 
foreign policy to be the Franco-British alliance,38 whilst a conseil supérieur de la défense 
nationale (CSDN) note of 12 October concluded that France must be ‘in close accord 
with Britain’ in order to ‘oppose further German strikes in Eastern Europe’.39 For 
Phipps, French attitudes to the entente bordered on desperation. France, he reported, 
‘attaches almost pathetic importance’ to Britain.40 
Phipps’s comments reflected a growing fear within British diplomatic circles – 
partly fostered by Paris - that French opinion was flirting with isolationism and even 
defeatism. Further concerns surfaced in a memorandum by the British military attaché in 
Paris, Colonel William Fraser, reporting the views of Général Henri Dentz, the deputy 
chief of the French general staff. Almost certainly aware of the growing press demand in 
Britain for conscription, Dentz seized the opportunity to heighten British fears of 
potential French isolationism. Britain, he warned, must ‘take care of French public 
opinion. France does not intend to allow Britain to fight her battles with French soldiers’. 
In the foreign office, alarm bells were ringing. ‘We must’, warned Halifax, ‘be careful to 
keep the French very close’.41  
                                                 
36 Corbin to Bonnet, 13 Oct. and 24 Oct. 1938, MAE, Série Z, Grande-Bretagne, no. 280. 
37 Phipps to Halifax, 3 Oct. 1938, TNA, FO 371/21767/C11502/4770/18. 
38 Bonnet’s speech to the Radical Party Congress, 29 Oct. 1938, cited in Le Temps, 30 Oct. 1938. 
39 CSDN, ‘Note sur la situation actuelle’, 12 Oct. 1938, Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre (SHAT), 
5N 579, dossier 1. I am grateful to Lora Gibson of the University of Aberystwyth for the reference to this 
document. 
40 Phipps to Halifax, 10 Nov. 1938, TNA, FO 371/21603/C13846/101/17. 
41 Memorandum by Colonel Fraser, 12 Oct. 1938; Orme-Sargent minute, 21 Oct. 1938; Halifax minute, 23 




Dentz’s warnings were not isolated, with reports from the Paris embassy and 
numerous British consuls evoking ‘undercurrents of defeatism’.42 For Halifax, a trip to 
Paris in late November was essential, if only to reassure the French. Direct conversations 
with the British prime minister and foreign secretary offered the French ministers 
another opportunity ‘to ask Great Britain to intensify and accelerate her military effort’, 
particularly vis-à-vis ‘her land forces for the continent’.43 Encouraged by post-Munich 
British press commentary, Corbin urged Paris not to allow Chamberlain to evade the 
issue. ‘Must we wait six months’ asked Corbin, ‘as in 1914, for the “first hundred 
thousand” to make their appearance on our soil?’ By contrast, the French military attaché 
in London, Général Lelong, was unconvinced that British opinion had evolved so 
dramatically, reminding Paris that many in Britain considered conscription unnecessary, 
retaining an almost illusory faith in French defensive capabilities: ‘They think that the 
French army, supported by the Maginot Line, must be capable of holding . . . 
indefinitely!’44      
Nevertheless, Lelong concurred with Corbin that France must demand a greater 
military contribution from Britain, perhaps motivated by the attitude of the British 
General Staff. As Imlay has noted, Major-General Sir Henry Pownall, the Director of 
Military Operations and Intelligence, instructed Fraser ‘to prompt the French to press 
the issue of the BEF’s size during the visit of the British ministers’.45 Daladier duly did 
so, arguing that two divisions were wholly inadequate. ‘More divisions were needed’, he 
argued, ‘and as far as possible they should be motorised’. His appeal, however, fell on 
deaf ears, Chamberlain quickly retorting that home defence must remain the British 
priority.46 The prime minister’s intransigence caused frustration on both sides of the 
channel. Pownall, who had hoped that Chamberlain and Halifax would return from Paris 
‘more receptive to the idea of sending troops to France’, subsequently lamented that the 
French had not pressed harder.47 
 
                                                 
42 Phipps to Halifax, 12 Oct. 1938, DBFP, 3rd ser., I, no. 187; Report from the British Consul in Bordeaux, 
13 Oct. 1938, TNA, FO 371/21613/C12852/1050/17. 
43 3o Bureau: Note concernant les demandes à présenter au Gouvernement britannique à l’action militaire 
terrestre, 23 Nov. 1938; Note, Section de Défense nationale, 22 Nov. 1938, AN, Fonds Daladier 496 
AP/11, 2 DA 4 Dr. 2, sdra. 
44 Corbin to Bonnet, 8 Nov. 1938, AN, Fonds Daladier, 496 AP/10, 2 DA 4 Dr. 3, sdra; Lelong: ‘Étude 
sur la participation de l’Angleterre dans l’éventualité d’une action commune franco-britannique en cas de 
guerre’, 8 Nov. 1938, AN, Fonds Daladier, 496 AP/35, 4 DA 8 Dr. 3 sdrb. 
45 Imlay, ‘The Making of the Anglo-French Alliance’, 110. 
46 Record of Anglo-French Conversations, 24 Nov. 1938, DBFP, 3rd ser., III, no. 325. 





In choosing not to press too hard – at least for the moment – the French had one eye on 
British opinion. As tensions eased after Munich, press discussion of conscription waned, 
and those newspapers most favourable to conscription were also opposed to a large 
expeditionary force. Moreover, the spectre of French defeatism perpetuated the image of 
a fractured and divided country, playing into the hands of the isolationists who 
questioned the wisdom of committing British forces to the defence of France. For the 
Daily Express, such a commitment was akin to ‘pledging the whole youth of Great Britain 
to a war for France’s frontiers’. The Daily Mirror was similarly sceptical: ‘What, another big 
army of fine young men for idiotic and arrogant dud generals to drive to death and 
destruction?’ The anticipated leftist opposition was also freely expressed, the far-left 
repeating the old arguments that military conscription would be the precursor to 
industrial conscription. The Daily Worker claimed that the ‘working class of Britain will 
not submit to be regimented while capitalists are left free to pick our pockets’.48 
Furthermore, an upsurge in French domestic unrest, culminating in the general strike of 
30 November, undermined British confidence in her ally. As Corbin warned, the French 
domestic situation ‘cannot be an excuse for Great Britain to limit her contribution to the 
system of Franco-British defence’.49   
Nevertheless, sections of the British government were more amenable to 
conscription. Halifax recommended a compulsory register to the cabinet on 14 
November, impressed by intelligence reports suggesting that such a measure would 
impress Hitler.50 Although Chamberlain’s counter-argument - that it would be of little 
practical value – prevailed, reports of potential French defeatism reverberated. Phipps 
noted a ‘widespread propaganda in France […] to the effect that in a major emergency 
France can only rely on Great Britain “to fight to the last Frenchman”’.51 At the same 
time, the French government intensified their efforts to extract a declaration of Franco-
British solidarity. For Paris, the shouts of ‘Corsica, Tunis, Nice’ in the Italian Chamber 
on 30 November reinforced the need for further British assurances. Moreover, the 
                                                 
48 Daily Express, editorial, 26 Nov. 1938; Daily Mirror, 26 Nov. 1938; Daily Worker, editorial, 28 Oct. 1938.   
49 Corbin to Bonnet, 26 Nov. 1938, MAE, Série Z, Grande-Bretagne, no. 291. 
50 Hitler was alleged to have claimed: ‘If the English have not got universal conscription by the spring of 
1939 they may consider their world empire as lost’. Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy, 14 Nov. 1938, 
TNA, CAB 27/624. 
51 Phipps report on the present situation in France (prior to the visit to Paris of Chamberlain and Halifax), 
16 Nov. 1938, TNA, FO 371/21600/C14025/55/17. 
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Italian demands appeared to unite French opinion, persuading London that French 
domestic unrest was dissipating, persuading even the isolationists that France was an ally 
worthy of increased British support.  
The French government’s firm response to the Italian demands was, as Jean-
Baptiste Duroselle notes, approved by ‘the quasi-unanimity of French public opinion’.52 
Coupled with the relative failure of the general strike, the societal upheaval of previous 
years gave way to increased unity, which was warmly welcomed by the British press.53 
However, Chamberlain’s stance remained worrying. When news emerged that 
Chamberlain intended to visit Rome in January, many in France suspected that he was 
seeking to mediate to the detriment of French interests.54 Chamberlain’s intentions were 
also questioned at home, where many were convinced that Britain’s priority must be 
assuaging French concerns rather than appeasing Mussolini.55 Duff Cooper argued that 
Britain must be capable of putting ‘into the field a respectable arm of at least ten or 
twelve divisions within a month or two of the outbreak of war’. Vansittart concurred, 
warning Halifax of ‘a very wide-spread feeling of discontent with us in France’.56  
Vansittart’s views were lent credence by Fraser’s report of 22 December, warning 
of the persistent French suspicion that Britain sought ‘to fight her battles on the 
continent with French soldiers’. The following day, he conveyed the concerns of the 
French general staff regarding ‘our refusal to accept the necessity for having an effective 
army’.57 In Paris, Bonnet again played the defeatism card: ‘it would be dreadful for the 
morale of the French army for Frenchmen to feel that they would be alone for so long 
before having the support of their allies’.58 A fusion of such reports, coupled with 
representations of a British public opinion increasingly keen to strengthen the Anglo-
French alliance, added impetus to arguments in favour of compulsory service. In early 
1939, rumours of an imminent German strike in Western Europe had even more telling 
repercussions. 
                                                 
52 Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, La décadence, (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1979), 391. Phipps reported how ‘I 
have never known French public opinion so unanimous as it is against Italy’, Phipps to Halifax, 21 Dec. 
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The ‘war scare’ of January 1939 stemmed from intelligence that Hitler might, contrary to 
previous assumptions, aim ‘an overwhelming blow at the Western Powers’.59 These 
rumours exacerbated fears of French isolationism, adding weight to French pressure for 
conscription. Indeed, it has been suggested that ‘bogus information provided by the 
French authorities via the Paris Embassy’ contributed to British fears of a German attack 
in the west.60 For Paris, the British decision in December to implement only a voluntary 
system of national service was inadequate, not only lacking an element of compulsion but 
also focusing on passive defence rather than an expeditionary force. When Corbin raised 
this concern, William Strang, head of the foreign office central department, retorted: ‘it 
was quite impossible for us in any immediate future to provide equipment for any larger 
land contribution than we had at present envisaged’. This echoed the current position of 
the cabinet, where Halifax’s arguments in favour of compulsion failed to shake 
Chamberlain’s conviction that ‘there could be, in fact, no possibility of Britain landing a 
large army on the continent’.61 
Nonetheless, the ‘war scare’ impelled the foreign office to re-evaluate the benefits 
of conscription. Vansittart needed little persuading, reminding Halifax ‘that Anglo-
French relations will be in severe danger and the capacity of French resistance will 
rapidly be exhausted unless we greatly increase our military contribution’.62 Again, 
Vansittart’s views were supported by news from Paris. As Dockrill has noted, French 
lobbying of ‘Colonel W. S. Pilcher and Kenneth de Courcy, newspaper proprietor and 
secretary of the imperial defence league, when they visited Paris in January’ fuelled fears 
of potential French isolation.63 Indeed, Pilcher and de Courcy’s report noted how Alexis 
Léger, secretary-general at the Quai d’Orsay, ‘related almost the whole of French foreign 
policy to the question of what contribution of a military character Great Britain might be 
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prepared to make’.64 Furthermore, both Gamelin and the military governor of 
Strasbourg, General Pierre Héring, spoke in the same terms to Hore-Belisha during the 
latter’s visit to the Maginot Line that same month.65 Such reports confirmed the 
conclusion already reached by the Chiefs of Staff: ‘France’s survival as a European power 
is conditional upon her being able to count on Britain’s support in any contingency that 
may arise’.66 Consequently, they advocated an increase in the size of the BEF as well as 
full staff talks between the two countries.  
For Paris, this provided another opportunity to emphasise ‘that recourse to 
conscription is the essential element of an effective British contribution to common 
defence’.67 Nonetheless, a Quai d’Orsay note acknowledged that British public demand 
for conscription was not yet overwhelming, and that the hostility of certain sections of 
British opinion remained problematic. Even those newspapers most explicitly in favour 
of augmenting the army, notably the Daily Express and the Yorkshire Post, were wary of 
overtly advocating conscription. In the present climate of opinion, concluded the Quai 
d’Orsay ‘it would be vain to hope that . . . the British government will spontaneously take 
the initiative’.68 Their conclusion was borne out by London’s response to a French aide-
mémoire of 1 February that again implored the introduction of conscription. Strang 
simply suggested that the reference to conscription ‘should be ignored’. Nonetheless, he 
acknowledged that Britain’s attitude required re-evaluation. The longstanding reluctance 
to commit to France, he remarked, had been based on the policy of ‘no more 
commitments’ and a latent distrust of France. However, ‘these days have now long 
passed’, and a failure to commit to France might push sections of French opinion 
towards advocating the abandonment of existing commitments, including obligations to 
Britain. Cadogan concurred, and wanted to reassure the French: ‘I know all the 
objections about “putting our foreign policy in the hands of the French Govt.” But 
again, in these days, is there much risk in that?’69 
Under considerable pressure, Chamberlain informed the Commons on 6 
February that ‘any threat to the vital interests of France from whatever quarter it came 
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must evoke the immediate co-operation of this country’.70 This declaration of Franco-
British solidarity provoked an almost euphoric reaction in the French press,71 and 
certainly delighted the French government. Indeed, Bonnet had urged Corbin to impress 
upon Halifax the need for such a statement.72 However, the conscription decision 
continued to elude them, and representations of British public opinion dissuaded them 
from pressurising London too strongly. Corbin warned that significant sections of British 
opinion continued to feel the ‘greatest repugnance’ towards conscription, ensuring that 
the government would encounter ‘very serious difficulties on the day it decides to 
establish it in peacetime’.73 Although Corbin’s appraisal was doubtless influenced by the 
persistent hostility of the British left, it was the lack of explicit support for compulsory 
service that was most worrying. In early 1939, calls for the introduction of conscription 
were barely evident in the British press, with most newspapers content to await the 
outcome of the voluntary system. Indeed, the only newspapers consistently in favour of 
conscription – the Evening Standard and Daily Express – were equally voluble in espousing 
isolationism.74 Furthermore, as tensions created by the ‘war scare’ began to dissipate, 
political support for conscription diminished and the issue faded into the background. 
However, this was to dramatically change in March, as Hitler’s manoeuvrings in Central 




The German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939 destroyed most 
remaining illusions regarding appeasement, and both British and French opinion 
demanded a firm response. Public disillusionment with appeasement had been evident 
for several months - at least since Munich - but it was the events of March 1939 that 
crystallized opinion. With appeasement seemingly defunct, Britain had to demonstrate a 
determination to halt Nazism by force, proving that she was both able and willing to 
uphold the guarantees provided to Poland, Greece and Romania in the immediate 
aftermath of the Prague coup. Conscription was increasingly seen as an ideal gesture. As 
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Hore-Belisha noted on 28 March: ‘Recent events had convinced me that we would have 
to have conscription’.75 Similarly, Cadogan was persuaded that ‘we must do something about 
our military strength […] it is the test by which other countries (including Germany) will 
judge’.76 
Greater cabinet support encouraged Halifax, who had argued back in February 
that conscription ‘will have a tremendous moral effect in France’.77 After the Prague 
coup, reports from the Paris embassy indicated that the French clamour was 
intensifying.78 Indeed, French newspapers joining the chorus for conscription to an 
unprecedented extent,79 whilst German and Italian newspapers mocked the british 
public’s unwillingness to embrace compulsory military service. André François-Poncet, 
the French ambassador in Rome, reported how the Italian press consistently highlighted 
the lack of British conscription, an observation echoed by his British counterpart, Lord 
Perth. On 31 March, the latter cited an article from the previous day’s Tribuna: ‘Arms, 
guns, pounds, aeroplanes, the home fleet, yes; conscription, no’.80 
The foreign office was evidently persuaded that British conscription would have 
a profound effect on the dictators, one official suggesting that ‘national service is the best 
weapon we can use to impress Mussolini that we mean business’. However, potential 
domestic repercussions remained troubling, and the left’s attitude was increasingly 
exasperating those in favour of conscription. As another foreign office official lamented: 
‘the people who are loudest in the demand for strong action refuse to take the one 
measure calculated to annoy and confound the dictators. Even Russia, which is held up 
as the pattern of democracy, has undemocratic compulsory service’.81 The persistent 
hostility of the British left compelled Corbin to remind Paris that whilst compulsory 
service was an unquestioned French tradition, ‘the psychological atmosphere is not the 
same’ in Britain.82 This contrasting ‘psychological atmosphere’ alarmed the French left. 
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As Phipps noted, ‘to the French Trade Unionist, as to all his compatriots, the idea that 
conscription should be undemocratic is impossible to grasp’.83  
On the British right, however, recourse to conscription was increasingly 
advocated. On 29 March thirty Conservative dissidents, including Churchill and Duff 
Cooper, tabled a motion calling for conscription to be introduced.84 Several days earlier, 
the 1922 Committee had expressed support for compulsory service, a fact not lost on 
Corbin.85 For Paris, these signs offered hope that a favourable decision was imminent. 
However, the British continued to emphasize that implementing conscription would be 
problematic; Halifax informed Bonnet of ‘the difficulties arising and how grave might be 
the repercussions on the whole strength and capacity of this country if they were rudely 
handled’.86 London’s anxieties were understandable given the voluble hostility of the far-
left. The communist Daily Worker questioned the need for conscription in predictably 
evocative and ideologically-motivated rhetoric: ‘Service for the traitors who have built up 
Hitler and Mussolini to the point where they can kill more British workers than the 
Kaiser killed on the Somme? Service for the Labour leaders who have backed these 
traitors?’87 
This latter point, however, illustrates that leftist opposition was not unanimous. 
Indeed, there was a clear distinction between, on the one hand, the more militant trade 
unions and the communists, and on the other, the leadership of both the Labour Party 
and the TUC. Certainly, much of the trade union and Labour opposition lacked 
conviction. As Hugh Dalton later acknowledged, ‘I did not believe that there was much 
deep-seated opposition to conscription’.88 Furthermore, prominent figures within the 
Labour movement attempted to change attitudes within the Parliamentary Labour Party 
(PLP). As Douglas Jay recalled, he and Hugh Gaitskill feared that the PLP would ‘make a 
fool of itself by demanding resistance to Hitler and voting against conscription at the 
same time’. Consequently, they ‘devised a scheme to avert this, and successfully sold it to 
Dalton’.89 This scheme focused on winning the Labour leadership’s support for 
conscription in exchange for a quid pro quo by way of the conscription of wealth. 
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Although Dalton and Attlee accepted the logic of this argument, the Labour leader was 
unable to sell the scheme to the PLP.90 Nevertheless, residual leftist opposition was 
overshadowed by the increasingly voluble campaign in favour of conscription. ‘[I]f the 
country decides that it must have conscription’, argued the Daily Mail, ‘then for Heaven’s 
sake let us have conscription now!’91 For French officials in London, public demand for 
conscription had reached new heights. As Lelong noted, ‘the idea of obligatory service 
has made notable progress’. More importantly, Corbin remarked how the campaign had 
assumed a very different character from that experienced after Munich. The inadequacies 
of the voluntary system had been exposed; compulsion was now being explicitly 
advocated.92 
Within the French press, both the Paris-Midi and Le Temps detected an evolution 
of British opinion in favour of obligatory service, as did Pertinax, who urged the British 
to bite the bullet: ‘Courage, M. Britling, acceptez la conscription et la paix sera sauvée’. 
Furthermore, the French left abandoned their previous reluctance to condemn their 
British counterparts. The communist Ce Soir questioned the confidence one could have 
in British firmness against the dictators whilst they refused recourse to compulsory 
service.93 The tone of the French press did not go unnoticed by British newspapers, with 
the Daily Mail, the Observer and the Sunday Times all noting that the French were anxious 
for Britain to introduce conscription without delay. Most tellingly, the isolationist Daily 
Express conceded that the current situation permitted them ‘to accept the alliance with 
France as something compatible with Isolation’. Indeed, isolation could be extended to 
the Maginot Line, ‘to become what may be called “Bisolation”’.94 
In such a context, Michael Howard’s appraisal of the decision taken at the end of 
March to double the size of the Territorial Army from 13 to 26 divisions – that it was ‘a 
response to the public mood, and as such was welcomed by virtually everyone’ – is 
indisputable.95 However, as Phipps reported, the French were unimpressed, and calls for 
conscription remained ‘a commonplace of any newspaper article or conversation, and 
was, I learned, impressed yesterday upon British journalists at the Ministry of Foreign 
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Affairs’. Several days later, Phipps informed London of ‘grumbling in the provinces no 
less than in Paris; and feeling is so strong that it might affect French morale in a future 
crisis’. In late April, a report from the British consulate in Strasbourg noted how ‘local 
criticism of Great Britain ebbs and flows in proportion to press reports on the 
imminence of our adoption of conscription’.96 Although Chamberlain appeared relatively 
unconcerned by French opinion, his cabinet could not be ignored. ‘Our people’, he 
remarked, ‘were getting very worked up about conscription’, although he himself ‘came 
down flat footed against it’.97 On 18 April, Hore-Belisha recorded how Chamberlain 
accused him of having ‘a bee in my bonnet about conscription’.98 However, Chamberlain 
was finding himself increasingly isolated. Paris thus sensed that the tide had turned, and 
that one last push would suffice for the British to finally succumb. 
     
VI 
 
By April 1939, as Roger Broad has observed, ‘increasing restiveness in France about 
British policy demanded more positive action’.99 On 18 April, Daladier informed Phipps 
in no uncertain terms of his desire to see conscription implemented in Britain, arguing 
that it would have a ‘propitious effect in France’, as well as furnishing ‘an excellent 
argument for the political negotiations with the USSR’. The following day, pressure 
emerged from another quarter when the American ambassador in Paris, William Bullitt, 
told Phipps that President Roosevelt ‘felt very strongly that it was absolutely essential’ 
that conscription is introduced.100 ‘The French are pressing us strongly’ noted Oliver 
Harvey, Halifax’s private secretary, ‘and we hear that even Roosevelt is dismayed that we 
haven’t yet taken this step’.101 By the time the former secretary of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence, Sir Maurice Hankey, suggested that ‘the French are a little overdoing 
the pressure about National Service’102, Chamberlain had already decided to introduce a 
form of conscription. In a letter to his sister he applauded himself for correctly 
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interpreting the mood of the people: ‘I believe we hit on the right moment when public 
opinion was ripe for the move and when the foreigners would not have been satisfied to 
wait for it much longer’.103 
 Why Chamberlain finally succumbed in April 1939 remains contentious. 
Evidently, the combination of French and domestic pressure had intensified considerably 
during the autumn and winter of 1938-39, and the introduction of conscription certainly 
did give Chamberlain a respite.104 However, military considerations must not be 
overlooked. As Len Scott has noted, ‘the government, and particularly Chamberlain, 
became obsessed with the fear of a sudden German knockout blow from the air’.105 After 
the Prague coup, Chamberlain viewed conscription as a necessary instrument for 
augmenting Britain’s anti-aircraft defences. Nevertheless, one cannot imagine that 
Chamberlain would have taken such a step were it not for the fusion of French and 
domestic pressure.  
The need to reassure Paris was certainly pivotal in the British decision. As 
Cadogan noted, when Phipps informed the French of the news ‘[t]hey burst into tears 
and flung their arms round his neck and agreed to anything we liked!’106 Of course, public 
support for conscription was not unanimous, and the government anticipated 
considerable difficulties in implementing it. In justifying the decision before the trade 
unions it was argued that ‘the march of events’ - which included ‘pressure from the 
French, as well as from almost all quarters of Europe’ - had made it ‘impossible any 
longer to neglect this further means of strengthening our defences’.107 Nevertheless, 
opposition was unavoidable, reflecting the deep-rooted hostility of many on the left. The 
Daily Herald deplored how: ‘without reference to public opinion, without consultation of 
any kind, conscription is imposed upon the country’. The Daily Worker was predictably 
more explicit, condemning conscription as ‘a way of fighting the British working-classes 
while the British ruling-classes make a deal with Hitler’.108   
Leftist dissent was also voiced in parliament. Chamberlain tried to pre-empt 
criticism from the left by citing the French Communist, Gabriel Péri: ‘It is impossible to 
contest the importance of the British decision’, Péri had written, ‘As long as this decision 
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was not taken Britain’s promises to Poland, Romania and Greece were of a more 
symbolic than practical character’. This cut little ice with the opposition. As soon as 
Chamberlain mentioned Péri, the sole communist MP, William Gallacher, interjected: ‘I 
repudiate him right away’. The Labour leader, Clement Attlee, also opposed the decision. 
‘Far from strengthening this country’, he argued, ‘it will weaken it and divide it, at a time 
when it should be strong and united’. The Liberal leader, Sir Archibald Sinclair, was less 
vociferous, simply lamenting the lack of consultation with the opposition and trade 
unions.109 Indeed, despite traditional Liberal opposition to conscription, the party had 
consistently failed to adopt a coherent position, a fact reflected in the Parliamentary vote. 
Although seven Liberal MPs opposed the conscription bill, six lent their support.110  
Overall, criticism was remarkably subdued. The Labour party arguably faced 
more criticism for opposing conscription than the government encountered in 
introducing it. The Daily Mirror described Labour’s opposition as ‘illogical’, whilst the 
Observer suggested that ‘a majority of the country is against them’.111 The liberal 
newspapers, which had previously been reluctant to express an opinion on the issue of 
conscription, also accepted the decision. The Manchester Guardian initially sympathised 
with leftist objections, but soon acknowledged that ‘British conscription is now an 
essential component of the Peace Front in which, far more sincerely than the 
Government, the Opposition parties believe’.112 Sinclair echoed this view in the 
Commons, conceding that conscription ‘has become – wrongly as I think, but I have to 
face the fact it has become – a symbol abroad of British strength and purpose’.113   
Although Labour’s opposition was more sustained, it too rapidly subsided. At the 
party’s annual conference in Southport at the end of May, a resolution calling for non-
cooperation with the bill was comfortably defeated.114 Similarly, hostility among the trade 
union leadership quickly dissipated once the bill had been passed. As Alan Bullock has 
noted, although Ernest Bevin was angry that the government had ‘brought in 
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conscription by the back door and tried to “put it over” on the working class’, he 
subsequently ‘exerted his influence against those who wanted the Labour movement to 
withdraw from all co-operation in defence preparations [and had little] patience with left-
wing talk of industrial action to resist conscription’.115 Furthermore, the TUC’s general 
secretary, Sir Walter Citrine, noted on 4 May that the ‘dangerous international situation 
had to be borne in mind’, and that the trade union movement ‘was committed to 
adequate national defence’.116 Even the more militant trade unions, notably the influential 
Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU), reacted ambiguously to the conscription 
decision and ultimately rejected protesting with industrial action. As Imlay concludes, 
when ‘the issue of military conscription compelled AEU leaders to choose, their hostility 
to fascism easily took priority over their hostility to industry and the government’.117 
Leftist opposition was also undermined by the criticism of French socialists. 
Léon Blum noted the contradiction between advocating a firmer foreign policy whilst 
denying Britain the strength necessary to enforce it. The trade unionist Le Peuple 
concurred, regretting ‘that we are not in accord with the British Labour leaders’. Overall, 
the Paris-Midi was correct in asserting that British socialists had received ‘a sharp dressing 
down’ from all quarters of the French left.118 On the whole, the French press welcomed 
the conscription decision with gratitude and delight. Le Matin remarked that when 
French conscripts cry ‘Bravo, l’Angleterre!’ they speak for the whole of France. Le Figaro 
described conscription as ‘a far-reaching material and moral gesture’.119 Phipps’s appraisal 
- that British conscription had been ‘enthusiastically welcomed by newspapers of all 
parties’ – was no exaggeration.120 As Corbin had predicted, the decision ‘will have 
immense reverberations across the world, particularly in France where it has been 
awaited with such anxiety’. In terms of Franco-British relations, the Quai d’Orsay 
suggested that ‘The establishment of British conscription marks, at last, a new phase on 
the common path pursued by France and Great Britain’.121   
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Ultimately, the most telling impact of the conscription decision was the positive 
effect it had on the French. Materially, conscription did not immediately facilitate the 
despatch of a larger continental force, as the majority of the new recruits were intended 
to man anti-aircraft defences rather than bolster an Expeditionary Force.122 Furthermore, 
conscription required considerable reorganisation of the British army (which was already 
struggling to facilitate its recent expansion) and an influx of men did not necessarily 
mean an increase or improvement in equipment.123 The limited scope of the bill, which 
applied only to those men aged 20 and 21, suggests further that it was a moral rather than 
a material commitment to the continent. Indeed, the key limitation of the bill was that 
men were only to be trained for six months, far from sufficient for furnishing a well-
trained field force intended for continental despatch. Indeed, the pro-conscription 
newspapers were quick to criticise the limitations of the Bill, the Daily Express 
considering it a ‘half measure’, a view echoed in the Evening Standard and the Daily Mail.124  
Therefore, as Roger Broad has concluded, ‘the gesture was more important than 
the substance’.125 In terms of the impact it had on the dictators, the effects were also 
mixed. Although it did not deter Hitler, it was certainly a fine riposte to German and 
Italian allegations that Britain was only prepared to ‘fight to the last Frenchman’. To be 
sure, even in its limited form the conscription bill satisfied much of the demand 
emanating from France. As the Paris-Soir remarked, ‘Berlin will no longer be able to say 
that Britain makes war with other countries’ soldiers’.126 Indeed, when defending 
conscription in the Commons, the prime minister remarked: ‘That gibe that Britain was 
“ready to fight to the last French soldier” is one that has been bandied about from capital 
to capital. It has been becoming clearer and clearer to us that the success of our whole 
effort to build up a solid front against this idea of domination by force was being 
jeopardised by these doubts’.127 
 
Without French pressure, it is highly unlikely that conscription would have been 
introduced in peacetime. However, French pressure would have been less persuasive if 
British public opinion had not become receptive to the idea of national service. 
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Moreover, the French campaign interacted with their perceptions of British opinion. In 
two distinct moments during 1938-9 – firstly after the Munich Agreement and secondly 
in the immediate aftermath of the Prague coup – Paris perceived an evolution of British 
opinion in favour of compulsory military service. Consequently, the French government 
intensified their pressure on the British government to augment their continental 
commitment, if only by the symbolic implementation of a limited form of conscription.  
The conscription ‘core sample’ also shows that the increased assertiveness of the 
French government during 1938-9 was always contingent upon their perceptions of 
Britain. Although France adopted a politique de fermeté independently of the British 
government, the representations of British press and public opinion furnished by the 
London embassy reassured the Daladier government that their stance enjoyed 
considerable support in Britain. In sum, the French policymaking elites recognised that 
the British public were increasingly advocating a policy of resistance over appeasement, 
and that they were subsequently more favourable to conscription. Arguably, neither 
French pressure nor public demand was sufficient in itself to force Chamberlain to 
abandon his opposition. However, the two factors working in tandem – a deliberate ploy 
on France’s part – provided a compelling argument for the introduction of British 
conscription. 
 
